

Building Resilient Maritime Institutions: Governance and Piracy Control in Southeast Asia

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ABSTRACT

Sea piracy has emerged as a significant maritime security challenge in Southeast Asia, disrupting trade and regional stability. This study employs the framework of good governance to analyze ASEAN's efforts in addressing sea piracy. Using a descriptive method, the paper assesses ASEAN's performance against sea piracy using 8 key governance pillars from UN. Findings reveal that ASEAN successfully implements several pillars, including participation, consensus oriented, and inclusiveness. However, other crucial pillars, particularly accountability, transparency, and rule of law remain underdeveloped. The ASEAN Way, with its emphasis on consensus and non-interference, often hinders progress on these pillars. Although framework like the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and forums like ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) exist, their impact is limited due to the lack of binding legal agreements, rendering many activities more symbolic than effective. In contrast, sub-regional collaborations such as the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) and the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea Patrol (SSSP) demonstrate greater success by adopting direct, actionable measures. These initiatives involve countries most affected by piracy and are driven by shared interests, leading to tangible reductions in piracy incidents. Indonesia plays a pivotal role as a key initiator of such collaborative efforts, particularly in the MSP and SSSP, reflecting its strategic commitment to maritime security and regional stability. The study concludes that while ASEAN has made progress in governance principles, its institutional effectiveness remains constrained, highlighting the importance of complementary sub-regional cooperation to combat maritime threats effectively.

Keywords: ASEAN, Good Governance, Maritime Security, Sea Piracy.

INTRODUCTION

Sea piracy is a steadily escalating crime that poses significant threats to global trade, the majority of which relies on maritime routes. Although piracy has existed since ancient times, it has never truly vanished, rather, it has evolved and expanded its operational areas over the past few decades (Arieli, 2012). This development represents a major threat to global commerce, as the sea remains a crucial element in transportation and international trade. The OECD reports that approximately 80% of global trade is conducted via maritime routes (Sinai, 2004). With the rapid economic development in Southeast Asia, sea piracy has emerged as an increasingly pressing issue, posing a direct threat to the region's economic growth.

Data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) indicates that Southeast Asia

experienced a high number of piracy incidents between 2005 and 2016. Since 2012, the region has reported the highest number of piracy cases globally, even surpassing previously notorious areas such as Somalia. This alarming trend underscores Southeast Asia's vulnerability to maritime piracy. Several factors contribute to this vulnerability, including political instability in certain countries, limited regional cooperation, dense shipping lanes, widespread poverty, high levels of corruption, weak maritime law enforcement, and the easy accessibility of weapons (Stach, 2017). The International Maritime Organization (IMO) reports that the most piracy-prone areas in Southeast Asia include parts of the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Both regions have shown an upward trend in piracy incidents, making them the most vulnerable maritime zones in Southeast Asia (Johnson & Valencia, 2005).

Eklof (2006) categorizes the operational methods of pirate groups active in Southeast Asia based on the geographical regions where they operate. The first category encompasses high-level armed piracy, which is predominantly found in the Sulu Archipelago of the southern Philippines and the offshore areas of eastern Malaysian Borneo. The second category consists of low-level armed piracy, typically occurring in the southern Malacca Strait, the Singapore Strait, Indonesia's Riau Archipelago, and the Bangka Belitung Islands. The third category involves high-level piracy and kidnappings for ransom, primarily seen in the northern part of the Malacca Strait.

Given the increasing trend of sea piracy in the region, ASEAN, as a regional institution, has a responsibility to address this challenge due to its significant implications for both the economy and regional security. In recent decades, there has been a marked global diffusion of good governance norms. Despite critiques that these norms impose Western values while overlooking local contexts, good governance remains a critical concept for fostering transparency, accountability, participation, and anti-corruption measures. Moreover, such standards can act as instruments to hold political elites accountable and enhance the protection of human rights (Steffek & Wegmann, 2021). Thus, good governance norms contribute to more equitable and effective governance across various global contexts. This study, therefore, employs the framework of good governance as its primary analytical tool to evaluate ASEAN's commitment and institutional capacity in tackling the issue of sea piracy in Southeast Asia.

The concept of good governance underscores not only the transparent and participatory exercise of authority but also the importance of legitimacy, accountability, and a results-driven approach to governance. It involves both state and non-state institutions playing essential roles in effectively executing government functions, including ensuring security, managing public sectors, and advancing social and economic objectives (Addink, 2019). Beyond its normative significance, good governance has been practically implemented through the development of governance codes in numerous countries. Since the early 1990s, many nations have adopted these standards, driven by international organizations such as the World Bank and the OECD, which have highlighted the critical role of sound governance in fostering economic development (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). O'Shea (2005) observes that most frameworks for good governance, whether explicitly or implicitly, incorporate fundamental principles such as balanced leadership structures, clearly defined roles, access to information,

transparent processes, honest reporting, and robust oversight mechanisms.

According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2019), eight core pillars define good governance. The first pillar is participation, which emphasizes the significance of inclusive engagement in decision-making processes, either directly or through legitimate representatives, and the protection of freedoms of association and expression. The second pillar is the rule of law, which mandates fair and impartial legal frameworks, independent judiciaries, and professional law enforcement that is free from corruption. The third pillar is transparency, which requires that decision-making processes be open, regulated, and based on information that is accessible and comprehensible to all stakeholders. Fourth is responsiveness, highlighting the capacity of institutions to address public needs and adapt to changing circumstances in a timely and appropriate manner.

The fifth pillar, consensus oriented, focuses on the importance of mediating diverse interests and fostering broad agreement on policies that promote sustainable development and the common good. The sixth pillar, equity and inclusiveness, ensures that all individuals feel adequately represented and treated fairly within governance systems. The seventh pillar, accountability, is a fundamental principle whereby institutions, whether public, private, or part of civil society, must be answerable for their decisions and actions to those they affect. Notably, accountability relies heavily on transparency and a fair legal system. Lastly, the eighth pillar, effectiveness and efficiency, refers to the ability of institutions to achieve desired outcomes while utilizing resources optimally. In this study, these eight pillars of good governance serve as the principal analytical framework. Assessing the degree to which these principles are implemented within ASEAN’s institutional framework is crucial, as good governance underpins effective and sustainable policy responses. This research is particularly important given Southeast Asia’s strategic role in global trade routes and the urgent need to enhance regional institutions to tackle non-traditional security threats, particularly in the area of maritime security.

METHODS

This study adopts a descriptive research methodology as outlined by Sugiyono (2020), focusing on providing an in-depth analysis of the subject matter without engaging in direct comparisons between different systems. The emphasis is placed on thoroughly understanding and interpreting the phenomena under investigation, rather than contrasting it with other cases or models. This study also using the qualitative analytical framework developed by Miles and Huberman (1994), which involves a structured three-phase process to analyze qualitative data. These phases include data reduction, where raw data is organized and simplified; data display, where the processed information is visually or narratively presented for easier interpretation; and conclusion drawing, where patterns and meanings are identified to generate final insights. Through this combined methodological approach, the study aims to produce a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of how principles of good governance are embedded and operationalized within ASEAN as regional institution in Southeast Asia. Rather than

comparing governance systems across countries, this research focuses on assessing whether ASEAN demonstrates alignment with key pillars of good governance in its approach to maritime resilience and piracy control.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

ASEAN’s Maritime Governance on Sea Piracy: A Good Governance Perspective

As a regional institution, ASEAN plays a pivotal role in promoting good governance, particularly in addressing transnational challenges such as maritime security. Within this framework, ASEAN’s approach to governance in combatting sea piracy merits closer scrutiny. Given Southeast Asia’s significant dependence on maritime trade and the strategic importance of locations such as the Strait of Malacca, regional cooperation and effective governance practices are essential to the collective response. This section examines how ASEAN’s dedication to the fundamental principles of good governance is manifested in its maritime initiatives, particularly through the lens of participation—one of the eight pillars of good governance.

The first pillar of good governance, participation, underscores the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders in navigating shared concerns. In its efforts to uphold regional security, ASEAN established the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), a critical element of the ASEAN Community envisioned in the Bali Concord II. This declaration laid the foundation for an integrated ASEAN, structured around three main pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Amer & Zuo, 2011). The APSC Blueprint, adopted at the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009, articulated a vision for a rules-based, peaceful, resilient, and outward-looking community. It served as a roadmap for the development of the APSC until 2015, with the flexibility to extend its relevance beyond that period (Kusumaningrum, 2013).

One significant outcome of the APSC Blueprint was the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), a dedicated platform designed for intergovernmental dialogue on maritime and ocean-related issues. The AMF aims to enhance maritime cooperation among ASEAN member states. It plays a vital role in bolstering navigational safety, regional maritime security, and collaboration through information sharing, technology exchange, and inter-agency coordination, particularly in search and rescue operations at sea (Gaol, 2017). The AMF’s existence is essential, given the prominence of maritime issues among ASEAN members. With extensive maritime territories, the region faces threats to sovereignty and transnational crimes, making maritime security a top priority (Rijal, 2019). The AMF convenes annually or as agreed upon by ASEAN member states. Its development also led to the creation of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2012, which functions as a Track 1.5 forum. The EAMF includes dialogue partners such as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States, involving them in discussions on shared maritime concerns.

Additionally, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)—which was established under the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime—represents a significant step in addressing maritime threats such as piracy at sea. This meeting is convened annually and includes ministers responsible for tackling transnational crime. Presently, ASEAN prioritizes ten major transnational crimes, including sea piracy (Srey, 2024). Through these strategic initiatives like APSC, AMF, EAMF, and AMMTC, ASEAN showcases its strong commitment to enhancing regional security governance and preventing maritime crime. Yet, a more in-depth analysis reveals that effective participation in good governance, according to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD (1989) hinges not only on the establishment of forums or platforms but also on sustained, inclusive, and participatory engagement. The DAC underscores that fostering meaningful participation necessitates strategies that involve a wide range of stakeholders in decision-making and policy implementation, with a particular focus on incorporating non-state actors (NSAs) alongside state authorities.

A study by Sundram (2025) highlights that non-state actors (NSAs) have gradually gained influence within ASEAN’s Economic Community (AEC) and Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). However, their participation in the Political-Security Community (APSC) remains significantly limited. This constraint is largely attributed to ASEAN’s state-centric approach, which hinders the effective involvement of NSAs in political and security-related issues. While the creation of the APSC represents a significant advancement in regional collaboration on maritime security, including combating sea piracy, effective participatory governance transcends mere institutional frameworks. It necessitates the active inclusion of diverse stakeholders, such as civil society, private entities, and regional maritime communities.

The next pillar of good governance is the rule of law, which underscores the significance of adhering to established legal frameworks. An independent judicial system is also essential to ensure accountability and the fair, impartial application of the law. Grerad (2018) notes that the ASEAN Charter formally embraces the principle of the rule of law in alignment with United Nations standards, linking it to democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, this commitment has faced scrutiny, as numerous ASEAN member states continue to adopt authoritarian practices. Although the rule of law has been increasingly incorporated into regional agreements, these commitments are frequently undermined by protracted bureaucratic dispute resolution processes and loopholes that enable member states to evade compliance. Consequently, the emphasis on the rule of law within ASEAN is often perceived more as a political maneuver than as a genuine legal commitment.

Joel Ng (2021) notes that while ASEAN countries have made significant strides, they remain in a transitional phase. This perspective aligns with Barry Weingast’s theory, which posits that developing nations are more likely to gradually establish consistent rules and open systems, rather than implement rigid legal frameworks before achieving stable economic growth. This does not imply that ASEAN members completely overlook legal norms; rather, ASEAN has historically refrained from imposing binding legal obligations on its members. As a result, legal enforcement is weak and largely relies on

voluntary compliance, which undermines the potential effectiveness of rule-of-law principles in regional maritime governance.

Regarding transparency, good governance mandates that information concerning norms and decisions from various ASEAN forums be readily available and accessible to all stakeholders. Transparency has emerged as a significant concern in ASEAN's governance, with ongoing criticism about the organization's lack of openness and public engagement, especially in decision-making processes and the formulation of agreements. The limited involvement of civil society presents a challenge to ASEAN's legitimacy and hampers the effective dissemination of norms (Allison-Reumann, 2017). This criticism is further supported by Cockerham (2010), who examined ASEAN's regional integration by reviewing agreements since 1967. His findings indicate that most ASEAN agreements are functional in nature and lack transparency. Many outcomes from ASEAN conferences, as previously discussed, are not compiled into publicly accessible documents, further emphasizing the organization's transparency issues.

Similar to the challenges in upholding the rule of law, ASEAN is actively promoting discussions on maritime issues through various forums yet has yet to produce concrete legal instruments or make the results of these dialogues publicly accessible. This highlights the need for a cohesive legal framework or shared instruments to guide and regulate maritime cooperation and security governance in the region.

In terms of responsiveness, which pertains to the organizational ability to act quickly and effectively in addressing emerging issues, ASEAN demonstrates notable insufficiencies. The organization has yet to create a dedicated body or forum specifically focused on the issue of sea piracy. Emmers (2007) argues that it is challenging to claim that ASEAN has a clear or coherent strategy for combating sea piracy. Among member states, there has been no formal agreement or collective implementation of recommendations that directly target this issue. Instead, sea piracy falls under broader agendas such as transnational crime, lacking specialized institutional mechanisms for direct address. During the Fifth ASEAN Maritime Forum in August 2014, member states explored the idea of establishing an ASEAN Coast Guard Forum to facilitate cooperation and coordination among regional coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies (Llewelyn, 2017). However, similar to previous discussions, these talks did not yield a binding set of rules or concrete action plans, raising concerns about the forum's practical contribution to tackling sea piracy in the region.

Consensus-oriented efforts prioritize achieving common agreement amid differing perspectives and interests. This approach is a defining characteristic of ASEAN, embodied in what is known as the “ASEAN Way.” This term refers to a set of rules and norms emphasizing decision-making through consultation and consensus, characterized by an informal nature. Additionally, the ASEAN Way underscores principles such as non-intervention, respect for territorial integrity, and peaceful conflict resolution. A key feature of the ASEAN Way is the commitment to refrain from questioning the sovereignty of member states while upholding the principles of non-interference and consensus in decision-making (Yukawa, 2017). With consensus as its foundation, ASEAN has successfully maintained regional stability despite the diverse interests among member states. These values reflect a dedicated effort to preserve harmony without

compromising national sovereignty. While often subject to criticism, the ASEAN Way is in line with one of the core pillars of good governance.

In terms of equity and inclusiveness, the focus lies in ensuring equal rights among countries as they address various issues. The foundation of ASEAN holds promise for building an inclusive community. Several crucial aspects have been effectively tackled, including agreements on economic development, political stability, joint diplomatic approaches, and peacekeeping initiatives in the region (Mohd Nor, 2020). ASEAN has consistently demonstrated its inclusive character by involving all member states in efforts to combat transnational crimes, such as sea piracy. In every initiative and forum mentioned, all member countries are afforded equal opportunities to actively participate and contribute according to their capacities. This exemplifies the spirit of equality and togetherness that underpins the principle of equity and inclusiveness, ensuring that no country is excluded from decision-making or the implementation of joint strategies to address regional security challenges.

Accountability serves as a fundamental pillar closely associated with the previously discussed concepts. A significant aspect of international law concerning accountability is the prevention of power abuse. It plays a crucial role in influencing individual freedoms and encompasses essential components such as participatory decision-making, information transparency, and grievance mechanisms, both at national and international levels (Pauwelyn et al., 2012). In the context of ASEAN, it appears that the organization tends to sidestep the integration of vital accountability elements, including transparency, personal freedoms, and complaint mechanisms, into its operational framework. There are still very few platforms that address the responsibilities of influential entities, such as large corporations or government representatives from ASEAN member states. Although some countries have established national judicial institutions, accountability does not seem to be a core value within the ASEAN system (Huck, 2020). This source suggests that the principle of accountability has yet to be broadly applied within the regional context, largely due to differing perspectives among ASEAN member states regarding the rule of law. In the case of sea piracy, ASEAN's accountability cannot be effectively assessed, as there exists no binding legal framework to adhere to. This highlights the limitations of non-binding laws in terms of efficacy.

The final pillar, effectiveness and efficiency, pertains to how well an institution maximizes outcomes by optimizing resources. When assessing ASEAN's effectiveness in combating sea piracy, one might argue that the declining number of cases indicates success. However, a closer examination reveals that the primary efforts to address sea piracy in ASEAN have been spearheaded by the country's most directly affected by the crime. These nations have implemented concrete actions rather than relying solely on the forums established by ASEAN. Sea piracy is often regarded as a domestic issue, which is why national and sub-regional responses tend to dominate the efforts. While ASEAN serves as a platform for cooperation and provides a regional voice on the international stage, its effectiveness is constrained by the absence of robust implementation mechanisms and sanctions (Emmers, 2007). Consequently, it is crucial to explore the measures undertaken in the region that extend beyond ASEAN as an overarching institution for its member states.

Piracy Control Initiatives Beyond ASEAN Initiatives

Efforts to combat sea piracy in Southeast Asia are typically conducted at both the national and sub-regional levels, as discussed previously. It is crucial to examine the initiatives taken outside of ASEAN as an institution, considering the various limitations that have been previously highlighted. One significant initiative is the MALSINDO cooperation, which involves Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. In an effort to bridge the operational gaps in combating maritime piracy, these countries bordering the Strait of Malacca took decisive action. One such measure was the launch of the MALSINDO Operation in July 2004, which featured coordinated patrols within their respective territorial waters. This initiative was further bolstered by aerial patrols under the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) program. In 2006, these two initiatives were merged to form the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP), which later included Thailand (Amri, 2014). MSP is regarded as the most effective security cooperation mechanism for mitigating piracy in the Strait of Malacca. A key component of this initiative, Eyes in the Sky (EiS), involves aerial surveillance conducted by the four participating nations. Each flight includes personnel from the countries involved, who report any suspicious activity to their respective maritime surveillance agencies, with a total of six flights carried out weekly. The initiation of MSP in 2005 yielded positive outcomes, with the number of piracy incidents plummeting from 38 cases in 2004 to only four in 2008 (Raymond, 2019).

In addition to the Eyes in the Sky initiative, the Malacca Strait Patrols consist of two primary components: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (MSSP) and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). This program mandates that each participating nation engage in coordinated sea and air patrols, bolstered by effective intelligence sharing among the four countries, thereby enhancing maritime surveillance capabilities in the Strait of Malacca (Hutabarat et al., 2020). The collaboration has been successful, as evidenced by the decline in piracy incidents within the strait persisting until 2013. This achievement can be attributed to the commitment of the participating nations to uphold joint agreements and mutual objectives aimed at securing the strait. However, the initiative has encountered challenges, including conflicting interests, budget limitations, insufficient personnel, logistical difficulties, and the potential for disputes among littoral states (Wijaya et al., 2017). Nonetheless, the countries involved in this collaboration continue to share the responsibility of protecting the strait, recognized as a crucial shipping route, notwithstanding their diverse national contexts.

On June 19, 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines established the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrol (SSSP), a maritime security framework designed to safeguard the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas from maritime crime. This initiative was modeled after the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP), which had previously been conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in the Strait of Malacca (Ikrami, 2018). The decision to implement patrols in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas was driven by a series of attacks by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which severely impacted maritime security in the three nations. In response to a rise in piracy incidents between 2015 and 2016, the three countries agreed to launch this initiative to confront various security threats, particularly those posed by the ASG (Espena, 2020). This common threat prompted the nations to develop a cooperative

framework that includes concrete measures such as joint patrols aimed at reducing terrorist activities in the region.

A study conducted by Rustam et al. (2022) assessed the effectiveness of trilateral cooperation in diminishing piracy and crew kidnappings perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Sulu–Sulawesi Sea region. This cooperation's success is attributed to several key factors: the relatively manageable nature of the problem, a high level of collaboration among the three nations, robust problem-solving capacities—including support from external actors such as the United States, Japan, and Australia—and the presence of a political context in which the countries were mutually supportive. The achievement and impact of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) are vital for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. This collaborative effort includes regular patrols, coordination, and intelligence sharing. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Defense, no piracy or terrorism incidents were reported in the first half of 2023, a notable contrast to the 99 cases of piracy and armed robbery recorded in the same patrol areas in 2017 (Costa, 2023).

These two cooperative arrangements serve as evidence of successful maritime security initiatives beyond the ASEAN framework, showcasing significant progress in reducing sea piracy in Southeast Asia. In both collaborations, Indonesia, as one of the countries with the largest maritime territory in the region, played an active role, often as an initiator, given the impact of such criminal activity on the nation's security. Furthermore, these partnerships have produced tangible outcomes, clearly illustrated by the declining number of piracy incidents, especially when compared to the period prior to their implementation.

CONCLUSION

Upon reviewing the implementation of good governance pillars within the context of ASEAN maritime security cooperation, it can be concluded that ASEAN has successfully adopted certain pillars such as participation, consensus orientation, and equity and inclusiveness. These elements are evident through dialogue mechanisms and member engagement in various forums, including the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC). However, several crucial pillars of good governance specifically accountability, transparency, and the rule of law remain inadequately realized. The principle of consensus and the "ASEAN Way," which prioritizes mutual agreement and non-intervention, often serve as significant barriers to achieving these pillars. This approach tends to diminish the decisiveness of decision-making processes and obstructs the establishment of binding legal enforcement mechanisms among member states. Furthermore, while numerous forums and meetings involving ASEAN countries are held, the lack of legally binding agreements renders these activities largely performative, with limited impact on addressing maritime security challenges, particularly in combating sea piracy.

From the perspective of effectively combating maritime crimes such as piracy, ASEAN as a regional institution still falls short of embodying good governance principles. ASEAN as an institution lacks a unified set of values or a common threat perception in

addressing sea piracy. This is primarily because only a few member states are directly affected by maritime piracy, while others, such as Laos, which is a landlocked country, do not view it as a significant concern. As a result of these differing national interests, regional efforts under ASEAN have struggled to produce cohesive and effective responses. Consequently, several affected states have shifted their focus to sub-regional mechanisms, where cooperation is more targeted and better aligned with the specific maritime security challenges they face. In contrast, tangible success has been more prominently demonstrated through sub-regional cooperation initiatives like the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas Patrol (SSSP). These efforts have proven effective in reducing maritime crimes due to their direct operational focus and concrete on-the-ground actions, rather than merely serving as discussion platforms. Furthermore, these sub-regional collaborations are motivated by the shared interests of countries directly impacted by piracy threats, fostering a stronger synergy and commitment to joint patrols, intelligence sharing, and proactive preventive measures. To achieve a more participatory governance structure at the regional level, a paradigm shift is necessary within ASEAN's framework and mechanisms, making it more receptive to the contributions of non-state actors (NSAs), especially regarding strategic issues like maritime security. In addition to amplifying the involvement of NSAs, ASEAN must establish a binding legal framework agreed upon by all member states. Such a framework is vital as it will serve as a foundation for existing forums to consistently monitor and assess the progress and implementation of each country's policies. By doing so, ASEAN can minimize symbolic or performative activities and enhance the effectiveness of genuine cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges, such as piracy, in a more structured and accountable manner.

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